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opportunities and thus lead it to investigate possibilities that might otherwise
be ignored.
In the light of these considerations, the authors recommend an ingenious type
of tax incentive of limited scope. This involves the creation of a special class
of domestic corporations, called United States Foreign Business Corporations,
which would be authorized to defer payment of United States tax on their
foreign income so long as such income was not used or distributed in the
United States. Such corporations would be permitted to engage in export as
well as foreign investment operations. The proposal appears to have certain
advantages over other proposals for tax incentives, particularly those involving
a simple rate reduction under existing principles. Thus, it would not give a
windfall to existing investments, but would be conditioned on the undertaking
of new investments. Also, it would avoid what appears to be a serious technical
difficulty: it gives tax concessions through rate reduction to foreign invest-
ment income while not providing a tax windfall to income from export opera-
tions. On the other hand, it would supply an incentive for exporters to expand
into foreign investment, since their earnings so invested would be tax free. In
common with proposals currently before Congress, it would end the present
anomaly whereby reinvested earnings of subsidiaries are tax free while earn-
ings plowed back by foreign branches of United States corporations are sub-
ject to the full United States tax.
The above account of the tax analysis and recommendations contained in
the the volume does not do justice to the detailed examination of the existing
tax system and alternative incentive devices in the last section of the study.
This should prove highly valuable to all concerned with the tax aspects of
international investment.
WALTE A. CHUDsoNt
THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY.
By D. G. Valentine. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955. Pp. xi, 273.
Guilders 18.30
THE European Coal and Steel Community is an unprecedented international
organization. The Court of Justice is one of the Community's truly original
and remarkable features, so unique that it does not lend itself to any traditional
categorization. Its jurisdiction, for example, is manifold: the Court may func-
tion as an administrative or judicial court, as a constitutional court and in
some specific instances as an international court with compulsory jurisdiction.
For this reason alone it is misleading and futile to attempt to classify the
Court under the heading of a traditional international court.
The considerable powers of the High Authority (the executive organ of the
tThe author is a member of the United Nations Secretariat, but the opinions expressed
are personal and do not necessarily reflect those of the Secretariat.
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Community), necessitated an extensive judicial control. Thus not only the
member states, but also the individual coal and steel enterprises and their
producers' associations, and even, in some instances, third persons may chal-
lenge before the Court the validity of an act of the High Authority.' Upon
appeal, the Court may review and annul any act of the Authority found illegal
"on the grounds of lack of legal competence, major violations of procedure,
violation of the Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or
abuse of power."'2 To assure an independent operation of the Community, the
Court has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes concerning the validity of acts
of the High Authority and other organs of the Community,3 as well as disputes
arising directly out of the formation and administration of the common, com-
petitive market for coal and steel. 4 National courts are explicitly disqualified
to deal with such disputes or even to interfere with the execution of the judg-
ments of the Court.5
By its nature the Treaty may be considered the constitution of the Com-
munity; it merely declares the principles of administration, delimits the powers
of the High Authority and conditions the exercise of these powers. The Court,
therefore, will perform an unusually extensive law-creating function. Particu-
larly when dealing with appeals for review and annulment or with indemnity
actions against the Community, the Court will develop a Community case law.(
This is necessarily so, because neither the national law of the member states
nor international law can offer a useful and workable framework. National
law was developed in a context different from that of the Community and
would seldom be applicable. Similarly, traditional international law has never
dealt with a problem of international control of business to the extent that the
Treaty does, and hence has not developed suitable precedents. Under these
circumstances the Court will elaborate its own law in the light of the Com-
munity objectives and the particular exigencies of each case. The Court may,
at best, consult the doctrine and practice of national courts dealing with similar
problems.
The novelty of the Court and its crucial role in formulating the Community
case law will raise a host of entirely new problems. For this reason Valentine's
1. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, April 18, 1951,
arts. 33, 35, 36, 63 (2), 65 (4), 66 (4) (English translation published by the High Authority of
the European Coal and Steel Community, hereinafter cited as TREATrY).
2. Id. art. 33, par. 1.
3. Id. art. 41.
4. Id. arts. 34,40.
5. Id. art. 92.
6. Conclusion of Court Advocate Lagrange in Affaire No. 3-54 entre 'Associatione
Industrie Siderurgiche Italiane' (Assder) et la Haute Autoriti reproduced in 1 CouR DE
LA JUSTICE DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER, RECUF-L DE LA
JURISPRUDENCE DE LA COUR 146, 148 (1955) (hereinafter cited as RECUEIL).
For a general discussion of this problem see DAVID, MALMSTR6M, VAN HECKE &
AUBIN, EUROP.ISCHE ZUSAMENARBEIT Im RECHTSWESEN (1955).
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recent study of The Court of Justice deserves special attention. It attempts to
explain in a detailed and authoritative manner the peculiar nature of the Court
and its intricate function. The almost minute discussion of the organization,
competence and procedure of the Court is most exhaustive. In the opinion of
the present reviewer the book represents one of the most comprehensive treat-
ments of this subject. The author's opening analysis of the revealing ratifica-
tion debates in the legislative bodies of the member states 7 is a truly original
contribution, well justified even by practical considerations. Since there are
no records of the Conference which drafted the Treaty, these debates and par-
ticularly the reports of various legislative committees may shed very helpful
light on the meaning of the Treaty provisions. On at least one occasion the
Court Advocate himself resorted to these reports when interpreting a Treaty
provision.8
In all fairness, however, some critical remarks and further clarification re-
main to be made. The basic weakness of the book, in the reviewer's opinion,
is the manner in which the author approaches the problem. His rigid, posi-
tivistic analysis is painstaking to the point of legal nihilism. By this analysis
he separates and makes clear a wide array of possible interpretations, but he
stops, almost paralyzed, at the crossroad of the alternative ways. His approach
pushes into complete oblivion the real purpose for which the Treaty provisions
stand. He shies away from considering the various interpretations in the light
of existing political and economic conditions and the objectives sought. The
author seems to forget that an analysis becomes meaningful only if it serves as
an instrument for advancing an interpretation that is not only feasible under
the particular circumstances present, but also likely to accomplish the aims
desired. In this respect he unfortunately fails to offer a creative, constructive
interpretation oriented towards the purpose of the Community.
It is not surprising, then, that the author engages in many barren considera-
tions, such as whether a member state or the Council of Ministers are required
when appealing to the Court to show that their interests are affected. 9 A
realistic appraisal of the distribution of political powers within the Community
would have suggested to the author that there is no room for such speculation.
The member states or the Council are still the most powerful components of
the Community-a fact which the Treaty recognizes. For this reason the re-
strictions on their right of appeal, which the author attempts to read into the
Treaty, are utterly unrealistic.
The author is so much the victim of positivism that he fails to visualize
practical problems the Court is likely to encounter. He ignores, for example,
the consequences that stem from the "constitutional" character of the Treaty.
The immense law creating function of the Court is not discussed. Nor is the
7. Pp. 6-33.
8. Conclusion of the Court Advocate Lagrange, supra note 6, at 154, 156.
9. Pp. 58-60.
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possible nature and development of the Community law considered. Instead
we are offered an inconclusive interpretation of Article 31 of the Treaty:
"Thus, it is not clear whether the words 'shall ensure the respect of law'
are to be taken as meaning that the Court is to be guided by the general
principles of international law, and is to subordinate the interpretation
and application of the Treaty to these principles; or whether the phrase
has a more restrictive sense and merely implies that in the interpretation
of the Treaty, the Court is to be bound by recognised rules of inter-
pretation and that the application of the Treaty shall be subordinate to
the law as set out in the Treaty thus interpreted."' 10
Some of the Treaty provisions are evidently misconstrued, particularly in
the discussion of the admissibility of appeals. For example, the author gen-
eralizes too quickly when he claims that "the doubt whether a party must...
have special interest in the matter in question before it can start legal action
is nowhere resolved by the Treaty."" A mere glance at article 66(5), which
grants to "any person directly interested" an appeal against an order of the
High Authority separating enterprises or assets illegally concentrated, dis-
proves the author's contention. Careful analysis would have disclosed that the
Treaty attempts to differentiate between the interests of the various parties. 2
Moreover, in his discussion of the conditions under which enterprises may
appeal, the author misinterprets a remark made by one commentator. Accord-
ing to the author that commentator erroneously maintains that "the party
suing need establish no such interest in the case. . . ."13 This is an unjustified
criticism, for the remark is made in reference only to a member state, which
is not required to show any interest when appealing. 14 The commentator in
the article referred to makes it unmistakably clear that he considers it neces-
sary for the coal and steel enterprises to allege interests affected when appeal-
ing an illegal act of the Authority. 15
The author's assumption that a member state must likewise show that its
interests are affected is nowhere borne out by the Treaty. The arguments ad-
vanced by the author as to the enterprises and other parties cannot apply to
10. P. 56.
11. P. 57.
12. This seems to be confirmed by the conclusion of Court Advocate Lagrange, supra
note 6, at 174.
13. P. 57.
14. Munch, Die Gerichtsbarkeit im Schumam-Plan in GEGENWARTSPROBLEmE DES IN-
TERNATIONALEN RECHTS UND DER RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE; FzsTscHRIFT FOR RUDOLF LAUN
123, 128 (Constantopoulos & Wehberg eds. 1953) explicitly stating: . . . Klageberechtigt
smnd zunchst Rat und Mitgliedstaat, ohne ein besonderes Interesse nachweisen zu milssen."
(Emphasis added.)
15. Id. at 129. "... Der Plan folgt dem franz6sischen Recht, bei dem es genfigt, dass




the privileged position that the member states are quite naturally granted.16
The history of the drafting of article 33 clearly shows a considerable reluctance
to grant any locus standi at all to the coal and steel enterprises., 7 And when
finally a compromise was reached on this matter, there was no intention of
placing the enterprises on the same footing as the member states. This differ-
entiation is quite evident in the Treaty. A State may appeal regardless of in-
terests affected 18 and may appeal even a general act on any ground of illegality
recognized by the Treaty.'0 On the other hand the enterprises may appeal only
if their interests are affected; and they can appeal a general act only on the
very strict grounds of patent misinterpretation of the Treaty or of specially
qualified misapplication of power.
20
The strong imprint of French administrative law on the structure and law
of the Community is undeniable, as is the strong influence of United States
anti-trust legislation on the provisions of articles 65 and 66 of the Treaty. In
several instances the author overplays this impact. An example is his inaccurate
assertion that the appeal against the inaction of the Authority provided in
article 35 was patterned after the French law ;21 Italian,22 German 23 and
implicitly Belgian law 24 admit similar appeals. Equally overstated is his as-
sumption that article 34, which commits the Authority to give effect to the
-Court's annulment of an act, follows French law.25 This principle is by no
means peculiar to French law. As a logical consequence of separation of
power, Italian, German and Belgian law likewise recognize such a principle.
Within the limits of these shortcomings this is an important book that de-
serves a full, critical appraisal. The criticisms offered cannot detract from its
16. P. 58.
17. Schille, Grenzen der Klagebefuguis vor dem Gerichtshof der Montanunion, 16
ZEITSCHPIFT FOR AuSLXNDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RE HT UND V6LKERRECHT 226, 237-8
(1955).
18. Confirmed by the Court in Arr~t de la Cour dans l'Affaire No. 3-54 entre 'Asso-
ciazione Industrie Siderurgiche Italiane' (Assider) et la Haute AutoritM, 1 RECUEmL 125,
138, and ArrUt de la Cour dans l'Affaire No. 4-54 entre Industrie Siderurgiche Associate
(I.S.A.) ct la Haute Autoritg, 1 REcuEt. 179, 193.
19. TREATY art. 33, par. 1.
20. Id. art. 33, par. 2. See further the conclusion of Court Advocate Lagrange, supra
note 6, at 171-73.
21. P. 95.
22. GALEoTr, THE JUDICIAL CONTROL OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN ENGLAND AND IN
ITALY 98 (1954); ZANOBINI, CORSO Di DiRiTro AmumisTRA~ivo Vol. II, 139-40 (6th ed.
1952).
23. EYERMANN & FROEHLER, VERWALTUNGSGERICHTSGESETZ 120-21 (2d ed. 1954);
FORTSHOFF, LEHRBUCH DES VER WALTUNGSRECHTES 446 (5th ed. 1955).
24. VELGE, LE CONSEIL D'ETAT 172 (1947) ; Moureau & Simmonard, Le Coneil d'Etat
Belgique, 64 REVUE Du DROIT PUBLIC Ex DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE 159, 175 (1948).
The Dutch administrative law seems also to know the concept of an appeal against
administrative inaction, KRANEBURG, NEDERLANDSCH STAATRECHT 430 (10th ed. 1951).
25. P. 71 n.4.
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great merits. In a way this is a pioneering work, and thus by its very nature
bound to be occasionally lacking in sophistication.
GERHAID BEBRt
THE MORAL DECISION. RIGHT AND WRONG IN THE LIGHT OF AmERICAN
LAW. By Edmond Cahn. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1955.
Pp. ix, 342. $5.00.
MR. CAHN, in his most recent book, has given us a painstaking study of a
subject that holds vital interest for all thinking persons. The book may perhaps
best be described as a detailed analysis and appraisal by a very thoughtful man
of the influence of morals on American law, chiefly our decisional law. The
author says:
"Our purpose is to learn what we can about good and evil and other
moral concerns by looking critically at the way American law deals with
them."1
Although he definitely seeks the advancement of a high moral plane-the
"good-in-law," to use his expression, his treatment is based almost entirely on
the natural order. For this reason some will miss, as I do, more explicit recog-
nition of the pervading influence of the supernatural in the realm of morals.
There are three parts-The Legal and the Good, Moral Guides in the
American Law of Rights, and Moral Guides in the American Law of Proce-
dure. The arrangement is excellent, with well chosen subdivisions, pointing
up appropriately the diverse problems with which the author deals in his in-
tense studies of his subject. There is also a short bibliography, and the book
is well housed.
The characteristics of self and the role of the conscience are among the many
factors discussed in the analysis presented of the moral "constitution" that
underlies much of our behavior. And because the author is aware of "the
beauty of those general standards that stem directly" from this constitution,2
the codified standards of moral legislation take on a broader and deeper sense
than mere enactments by legislative bodies. For example, "we see [moral
legislation] . . . in objective behavior because a subjective individual has en-
acted it in his conscience." 3 Again, after a wealth of illustrations reviewing
those factors which have played a part in the growth of moral legislation, the
author concludes that such legislation "will always reflect the mutations of
times and places-but it does so in the mirror of an expanding moral con-
stitution...."4
tVisiting Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School.
1. P. 11.
2. P. 19.
3. P. 31.
4. Ibid.
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